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ABSTRACT
For centuries, our thought privacy has been reasonably well protected by the difficulty others have
in deciphering our thoughts. This natural protection is in jeopardy, lnoever, as emerging
technologies improve our ability to, loosely speaking, read minds. When these methods get cheaper
and more accurate, the state may seek to monitor and regulate thought in ways previously
impossible.
The First Amendment undoubtedly protects thought privacy, but current law leaves open two very
different levels of protection: On one view, thought is only protected when intertwined with
expression. If so, we have rather weak First Amendment freedom of thought, since thoughts often go
unexpressed. Alternatively, thought may be protected independent of expression. If so, our freedom
of thought is more expansive.
I explore these views by considering blackjack players who "count cards." Card counters perform
mental calculations on publicly available information-the cards dealt in plain sight-in order to
turn the odds in their favor. Even though card counting does not obviously implicate expression, I
argue that the First Amendment plausibly gives us the right to count cards in our own minds.
More controversially, I argue that the Amendment may even protect the right to count cards when
combined with an overt action, such as betting in a casino. A criminal prohibition on betting
while counting cards might constitute impermissible thought-content discrimination by permitting
bettors to make the basic calculations required to play blackjack but not the more predictive
calculations used to count cards.
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INTRODUCTION
Most of us are confident in the privacy of our thoughts because
there is little the government can do to decipher them. Relying on
the natural privacy of thought, Justice Frank Murphy wrote in the
1940s that "[f]reedom to think is absolute of its own nature" because
"the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward
workings of the mind."'
Our natural protection of thought is in jeopardy, however, as
emerging technologies begin to allow us, loosely speaking, to read
1 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 618 (1942) (Murphy,J., dissenting).
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minds.2 Using functional magnetic resonance imaging ("fMRI"), for
example, neuroscientists can make reasonably good guesses about
what a subject in a brain scanner is looking at, be it a still image3 or,
at a very primitive level, a video. A 2012 study showed that subjects
can be taught to mentally spell words in a manner researchers can
decode in real time using a brain scanner.' And when patients have
electrodes directly connected to their brains before surgery, comput-
ers can do a surprisingly good job of decoding the sentences in their
inner voices.! Some think we'll soon be able to do the same with non-
invasive brain-scanning techniques.' We won't read minds in any
spooky sense, but we will get better at correlating brain activity with
mental activity in order to infer what people are thinking.
As mind reading technology becomes cheaper and more accurate,
the state may seek to regulate thought in ways that threaten the pri-
vacy of our mental lives. It is not at all clear if the Constitution would
protect us from such invasions. Many free speech cases trumpet our
freedom of thought but say frustratingly little about the contours of
the protection." Most notably, they conceal whether the First
Amendment protects thought itself (what I'll call the independent
view) or only protects thought when it is linked to expression (what
I'll call the intertwined view).
As a test case for these two views of First Amendment thought pri-
vacy, imagine a prohibition of "card counting" at the blackjack table.
2 See generally Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807, 827-41
(2014); see also Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585 (2011)
(describing emerging and futuristic technologies to more objectively assess experiences
like pain and suffering).
3 See, e.g., Kendrick N. Kay et al., Identifying Natural Images from Human Brain Activity, 452
NATURE 352 (Mar. 20, 2008); Thomas Naselaris et al., Bayesian Reconstruction of Natural
Images from Human Brain Activity, 63 NEURON 902 (Sept 24, 2009).
4 See, e.g., Shinji Nishimoto et al., Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked by
Natural Movies, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1641 (Oct. 11, 2011).
5 Bettina Sorger et al., A Real-Time JMRI-Based Spelling Device Immediately Enabling Robust Mo-
tor-Independent Communication, 22 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1333 (July 24, 2012).
6 See Brian N. Pasley et al., Reconstructing Speech from Human Auditory Cortex, 10 PLOS
BIOLOGY e1001251 (2012); see also Adam Piore, To Study the Brain, a Doctor Puts Himself
Under the Knife, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/543246/to-study-the-brain-a-doctor-puts-himself-
under-the-knife/.
7 In 2012, neuroscientistJack Gallant told me that "[w]ithin a few years, we will be able to
determine someone's natural language thoughts using fMRI-based technology." E-mail
from Jack Gallant, Professor of Psychology, Univ. of Calif. at Berkeley to Adam Kolber,
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (August 24, 2012, 05:50 EST) (on file with au-
thor). Gallant predicts that early attempts will be only modestly successful but that "some
time in the further future, [the technology] will work well enough to be useful." Id.
8 See infra Part I.C.
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To play blackjack, you have to make simple calculations to determine
the value of the cards in your hand. Card counters, however, make
further calculations based on all of the cards dealt in plain view.
These calculations enable them to turn the odds of winning in their
favor.
A criminal prohibition of card counting would arguably constitute
impermissible thought-content discrimination by permitting bettors to
make the basic calculations required to play blackjack but not the
more predictive calculations used to count cards. Since card count-
ing does not obviously implicate expression, however, whether or not
the First Amendment precludes a card counting prohibition may
turn on whether the Amendment protects thought independently or
only when intertwined with expression.
While ordinary card counting is not currently criminalized, we can
surely imagine casinos pushing to criminalize it. Casinos already suc-
cessfully lobbied for laws that make it a felony to count cards with the
aid of a device. When a card counting app was developed on the
iPhone (which included a special "stealth mode" to make it hard to
detect), the Nevada Gaming Control Board issued an open letter
warning that using such a device to count cards in a casino is a seri-
ous crime.9 So if you make your betting computations solely in your
head, the criminal law currently leaves you alone. But if your betting
computations are assisted by a computer, you can be punished by up
to six years in prison for a first offense.o Although you retain many
of your free speech rights when aided by technologies like a printing
press or the Internet, you apparently have no thought-privacy right to
engage in computer-assisted betting computations (although no one,
to my knowledge, has argued the matter in court). If I can show that
an ordinary card counting prohibition would raise questions under
the First Amendment, then anti-device laws are at least worth examin-
ing as well.
In Part I, I discuss First Amendment rights to freedom of thought
and consider whether the Amendment protects thought inde-
pendently or only when intertwined with expression. In Part II, I de-
scribe card counting and propose a hypothetical statute prohibiting
players from increasing their bets based on the card count. Card
counting lets us test the boundaries of our freedom of thought with-
out imagining futuristic brain scanners: it is often easy to determine
9 See Letter from Randall E. Sayre, Bd. Member, State of Nev. Gaming Control Bd., to All
Nonrestricted Licensees and Interested Parties (Feb. 5, 2009), available at
http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentd=5343.
10 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 465.088 (2010).
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when players are counting cards based on their betting patterns.
These patterns would almost never arise by chance, and special soft-
ware can help detect card counters."
Finally, in Part III, I argue that card counting (without a device) is
plausibly protected under both the independent and intertwined
views of First Amendment freedom of thought. I makenot a norma-
tive claim but a predictive claim about the behavior of judges. Given
the limited doctrine on the topic, I predict that at least a significant
minority ofjudges would deem a card counting prohibition unconsti-
tutional, even if the prohibition were tied to an action such as bet-
ting. If I'm right, First Amendment concerns would also plausibly be
raised by other laws implicating free thought and action, were, for
example, the government to prohibit camping in a public park while
thinking the mayor is incompetent or enhance punishment for those
who "knowingly kill a Republican" but not those who "knowingly kill
a Democrat." More important than my speculative prediction about
the scope of the Amendment, I identify the contours of First
Amendment freedom of thought that require resolution in the face
of obtuse Supreme Court proclamations on the subject and suggest
how courts might begin to translate doctrine protecting expression
into doctrine protecting freedom of thought.
Constitutional protection of thought may emerge not only from
the First Amendment, but also from the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. First Amendment freedom of expression
is a reasonable place to begin our inquiry, however, for two reasons.
First, a card counting prohibition would arguably constitute the kind
of thought censorship the First Amendment is said to protect. Se-
cond, even if other constitutional provisions protect thought privacy,
the nature of the protection may vary based on its source. A substan-
tive due process protection rooted in bodily autonomy might protect
ordinary card counting but not device-assisted card counting. By
contrast, the truth-seeking function of the First Amendment might
protect both. (The common practice of ejecting card counters from
casinos, which are privately owned but highly regulated, may also of-
fend the Constitution, though I leave such issues for another occa-
sion.)
One may be tempted to dismiss card counting as trivial. Surely we
would survive without it. But such reasoning is generally anathema to
First Amendment analysis. As a matter of principle, the Amendment
not only protects trivial expression but also a great deal of expression
11 Casino System to Spot Card Counters Before They Cash In, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 10, 2009, at 19.
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that is harmful and hateful. It remains to be seen whether the First
Amendment protects thought to the same extent. But even if the
protection is weaker, when we consider the relative costs and benefits,
a card counting prohibition would arguably constitute heavy-handed
thought control to further relatively unimportant societal goals.
More broadly, the issues raised by card counting help us envision the
boundaries of freedom of thought as we enter a world in which our
thoughts become more and more transparent without our having to
express them.
I. Two WAYS THE FIRST AMENDMENT MAY PROTECT THOUGHT
The Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment
protects freedom of thought, but the Court has never clearly de-
scribed the contours of the protection.1 2 One important question
that courts have never resolved is whether freedom of thought is only
protected by the Amendment in cases that implicate expression. If a
court adopts the intertwined view, it means that freedom of thought is
only protected in particular cases that implicate the sorts of expres-
sion typically recognized by courts in the free speech domain. On
this view, no matter how much the state burdens freedom of thought,
the First Amendment is irrelevant absent a connection to expression
in the case at bar.
One might adopt the intertwined view if one believes that free-
dom of thought holds only instrumental value from a First Amend-
ment perspective. If thought is only valued as a way of promoting ex-
pression, there is nothing particularly special about freedom of
thought from a free speech perspective. Freedom of thought would
be protected just like "freedom of celluloid" or "freedom of pencils."
Celluloid and pencils are not intrinsically valued from a free speech
perspective but are valued to the extent that they enable or promote
expression. One might also adopt the intertwined view if freedom of
thought holds only modest value from a First Amendment perspec-
tive such that freedom of thought is simply insufficient to generate
protection absent a connection to expression. Either way, if the in-
tertwined view is correct, card counting must have a connection to
expression in the case at bar or it will not be protected by the
Amendment.
By contrast, if the independent view is correct, the First Amendment
protects freedom of thought even in cases that lack recognized forms
12 See infra Part I.C.
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of expression. One might adopt the independent view if one believes
the Amendment values thought separately from expression and does
not require expression in order to kick in. Alternatively, one might
believe that thought is only instrumentally valuable from a First
Amendment perspective but consider the connection between
thought and expression to be so close and important that we need
not find expression in any particular case. For example, a law that
prohibits certain thoughts without any reference to action arguably
violates the Amendment because the very possibility that the state
could burden pure thought will hinder thinking in ways that chill ex-
pression in other contexts.
A. Text of the Amendment
The pertinent portion of the First Amendment states that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press."14  Taken literally, the text of the Amendment provides
some support for the intertwined view. Even though freedom of the
press and freedom of speech are quite similar, they are both men-
tioned separately. Freedom of thought is not explicitly enumerated,
and so, to the extent it is protected, it is arguably parasitic on free-
dom of speech, which is explicitly enumerated.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court recognizes rights that are
"not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amend-
ment."05 For example, the text never mentions forms of expression
that do not literally involve "speech," but the First Amendment now
clearly protects music and painting."' Similarly, the First Amendment
protects freedom of association, though it never specifically provides
for it in the text." The Supreme Court has emphasized that "the
Framers were concerned with broad principles, and wrote against a
13 I focus on the intertwined-independent question in the text because it is easier to deter-
mine whether courts require expression to invoke the Amendment than to determine
what the Amendment values intrinsically or only instrumentally. But the intrin-
sic/instrumental question is important as well. Suppose, for example, that a court is scru-
tinizing the state's interest in regulating expression relative to the First Amendment
harms of doing so. If thought is valued for its instrumental effect on expression, then
courts can assess First Amendment interests just by focusing on the value of the pertinent
expression. By contrast, if thought holds non-instrumental value, then we need to con-
sider the value of both free thought and free expression.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15 Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
16 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
17 The Amendment does, however, protect "the right of the people peaceably to assemble."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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background of shared values and practices."" So if the Amendment
can be read as protecting unspoken forms of expression and forms of
association that go beyond expression (and beyond rights to peacea-
bly assemble), then it plausibly also protects thought independent of
its relationship to expression.
The Supreme Court has said that the Amendment does protect
unenumerated rights that "are nonetheless necessary to the enjoy-
ment of other First Amendment rights."9 This language could be
read to support the intertwined view by suggesting that unenumerat-
ed rights must be in service to rights that are already recognized. If
an unenumerated right to free thought must be in service to the
enumerated right to free speech, it would cast doubt on the inde-
pendent view. But painting, making music, and dancing receive un-
enumerated protection, and it is unlikely that they are only protected
as a means of promoting speech.
Though freedom of thought is not explicitly mentioned in the
First Amendment, the founding generation was probably familiar
with the concept.20 The Sixth Circuit has said that "[a] concern for
freedom of thought was present at the time of the adoption of the
First Amendment, and this provision is closely associated historically
with that concern."' In 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to en-
courage the adoption of the Bill of Rights, stating that "[t]here are
rights which it is useless to surrender to the government, and which
governments have yet always been found to invade. These are the
rights of thinking, and publishing our thoughts by speaking and writ-
ing .... " The fact that the founding generation thought about
mental privacy makes its absence from the Amendment more nota-
ble, yet leaves open the possibility that freedom of thought was al-
ready deeply embedded in the enumerated right to free speech. I
leave it to others, however, to assess whether evidence of the original
meaning of the First Amendment (and the Fourteenth Amendment)
18 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604.
19 Id.
20 See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEx. L. REv. 387, 409-10 (2008).
21 Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 718 (6th Cir. 2001). The court also
quoted the pre-revolutionary writings of Cato: "Without freedom of thought, there can
be no such thing as wisdom; and no such thing as publick liberty, without freedom of
speech: Which is the right of every man, as far as by it he does not hurt and control the
right of another...." 1 JOHN TRENCHARD AND THOMAS GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS No.
15, 110 (Ronald Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund 1995) (1755).
22 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to David Humphreys, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 323
(Lipscomb & Bergh eds., 1903).
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better supports the intertwined or independent view and how much
such evidence is likely to influence courts today.
B. First Amendment Rationales
There is much debate about the underlying purpose or purposes
of the First Amendment. I draw attention to just two threads of the
discussion. One gives priority to freedom of thought in justifying
rights to free expression. In A History of Freedom of Thought, J.B. Bury
claimed that there is a "natural liberty of private thinking."2" Fur-
thermore, it "is unsatisfactory and even painful to the thinker himself,
if he is not permitted to communicate his thoughts to others .... " 24
Hence, "[s]ome have preferred, like Socrates ... to face death rather
than conceal their thoughts."25 In Bury's view, "freedom of thought,
in any valuable sense, includes freedom of speech."2 In other words,
he emphasized that freedom of speech is just a subset of and a pre-
requisite to freedom of thought.
Along similar lines, Seana Shiffrin has offered a "thinker-based"
justification for free speech rooted in the autonomy interests of both
speakers and listeners. She writes that "[w]e should understand free-
dom of speech as, centrally, protecting freedom of thought,"2 even if
current doctrine sometimes falls short.28 On her view, we should pro-
tect freedom of speech to further the deeper principle of freedom of
thought:
[I]t is essential to the appropriate development and regulation of the
self, and of one's relation to others, that one have wide-ranging access to
the opportunity to externalize one's mental contents, to have the oppor-
tunity to make one's mental contents known to others in an unscripted
and authentic way, and that one has protection from unchosen interfer-
ence with one's mental contents from processes that would disrupt or
disable the operation of these processes. That is to say, free speech is es-
29
sential to the development and proper functioning of thinkers.
Other theories, she contends, give insufficient pride of place to
people's autonomy interests in their own mental lives:
[M]any popular theories of freedom of speech only make sense if the in-
dividual mind and the autonomy of its operation . .. are valued and
23 J.B. BURY, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT 1 (H.J. Blackham ed., 2d ed. 2007).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach lo Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 283, 283 (2011).
28 Id. at 284.
29 Id. at 294.
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treated with respect. If we did not regard the autonomy of the individual
mind as important, it is hard to see why we would value its expression or
outputs in the way and to the degree that truth theories or democratic
theories value speech. The same holds true of speaker-based and listen-
er-based theories.30
Along similar lines, Neil Richards has written that "if there is any
constitutional right that is absolute, it is [the freedom of thought and
belief], which is the precondition for all other political and religious
rights guaranteed by the Western tradition."" Richards believes that
"all leading theories of the First Amendment rest on the importance
of freedom of thought." According to Richards, " [a] ny meaningful
freedom of speech requires an underlying culture of vibrant intellec-
tual innovation" that nurtures "the engine of expression-the imagi-
nation of the human mind." Moreover, Richards implicitly endorses
the independent view, writing that "[t]he First Amendment should
protect cognitive activities even if they are wholly private and un-
shared because of the importance of individual conscience and au-
tonomy."
Of course, just because some scholars give priority to freedom of
thought in justifying rights to free speech doesn't mean the Constitu-
tion does the same. Moreover, for all the talk of protecting freedom
of thought, there is another thread in First Amendment jurispru-
dence that emphasizes the communicative nature of expression." As
Eugene Volokh puts it, " [ulnder nearly every theory of free speech,
the right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate-to
persuade and to inform people through the content of one's mes-
sage."" If the Amendment is really about promoting communication,
free thought may play just a subsidiary role. If, for example, commu-
nication is essential to the "marketplace of ideas" rationale for the
First Amendment, the Amendment arguably only supports the inter-
twined view since unexpressed thoughts may never make it to the
marketplace."
30 Id. at 288.
31 Richards, supra note 20, at 408.
32 Id. at 406.
33 Id. at 404.
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theoy of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 54 (1989).
36 Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Coures of Conduct, "Sit-
uation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1277, 1304 (2005).
37 Others focus on the role of expression to foster political self-governance or democratic
culture in ways that may or may not require independent protection of free thought. Cf,
e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom ofExpression for
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C. Some Cases Consistent With Intertwinement
Thought privacy is mentioned frequently enough in First
Amendment cases that it is clearly protected in some respect. The
Supreme Court has stated that the First Amendment protects "free-
dom of belief," "freedom of mind," and "freedom of thought."0 Ac-
cording to Justice Brandeis, the founding generation "believed that
the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their fac-
ulties; and that ... freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth."09 Justice Cardozo wrote that "the domain of liberty ... has
been enlarged by latter-day judgments to include liberty of the mind
as well as liberty of action."4 ChiefJustice Burger wrote that a statute
that required motorists to display license plates containing the state
motto was inconsistent with "the right of freedom of thought protect-
ed by the First Amendment," as "[t] he right to speak and the right to
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broad-
er concept of 'individual freedom of mind."' 41 These examples just
scratch the surface of the many such references to our "freedom of
mind" and other broad statements related to thought privacy in Su-
preme Court First Amendmentjurisprudence.
Collectively, these statements seem to support a broad right to
freedom of thought. But whenever freedom of thought has been
protected by the Supreme Court, it has always been in cases that also
involve the regulation of expression or expressive conduct. So the
Court has never taken a clear position on whether thought must be
intertwined with expression in order to be protected.
In Palko v. Connecticut,43 for example, the Court stated that "free-
dom of thought, and speech . .. is the matrix, the indispensable con-
dition, of nearly every other form of freedom."44 By specifically men-
tioning "freedom of thought and speech" as one freedom, the quote
the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2004) (stating that "[t]he purpose of free-
dom of speech . . . is to promote a democratic culture" that "allows ordinary people to
participate freely in the spread of ideas and in the creation of meanings that, in turn,
help constitute them as persons").
38 See generally Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1, 17 (1989).
39 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
40 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
41 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
42 See generally Winick, supra note 38, at 135-88 (citing cases).
43 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
44 Id. at 326-327.
1391
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
might suggest that the freedom contains two separate components
that are both worthy of independent respect. Or maybe it emphasiz-
es that the two are intertwined. Either way, the language is dicta.
The case itself concerns whether the double jeopardy protections of
the federal constitution apply to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 5
In Kovacs v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that municipalities
are permitted to prohibit trucks with sound amplification systems
from making "loud and raucous" noises.6 In a concurrence, Justice
Frankfurter noted "the steadily narrowing opportunities for serenity
and reflection. Without such opportunities freedom of thought be-
comes a mocking phrase, and without freedom of thought there can
be no free society."4  Neil Richards takes Kovacs to support his view
that the First Amendment protects thought privacy by affording us
certain "spaces-physical, social, or otherwise-to allow us to think
freely and without interference."" "Without the space and time to
think," Richards adds, "legal protections on free thought become
merely empty promises."4 9
If indeed Kovacs identifies a First Amendment interest in avoiding
loud noises in order to promote freedom of thought, it would suggest
that the First Amendment protects thought independently. After all,
the people potentially annoyed by the loud speakers were not neces-
sarily expressing thoughts at all. Unfortunately, there is little evi-
dence that the Court identified a First Amendment interest in pro-
tecting the solemnity of reflection. It seems at least as likely and
probably more so that the Court was merely limiting the First
Amendment rights of those broadcasting loud noises. Nothing in the
opinion shows that the interests in the solemnity of reflection were
themselves rooted in the First Amendment.
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit decided a case
that more closely tests whether the First Amendment requires inter-
twined expression. In Doe v. City of Lafayettej Doe had a record of ar-
rests and convictions for sexually-related crimes against children.1 In
January of 2000, he went to a public park, sat on a bench, and spent
about fifteen to thirty minutes watching several children in their ear-
45 Id. at 321.
46 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
47 Id. at 97 (Frankfurter,J., concurring).
48 Richards, supra note 20, at 413.
49 Id.
50 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, 334 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2003).
51 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2004).
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ly- to mid-teens play in the park. Doe admitted having sexual
thoughts about he children, including urges to expose himself or
have sexual contact with them. But at least in part because of the
high number of children present, his thoughts "weren't realistic at
the time" and "were just thoughts.""5 Doe attended a support group
where he confessed what happened on this particular day. A tip to
Doe's probation officer from a confidential source" eventually led
the Lafayette parks department to ban Doe from the city's parks and
schools."6 Among his claims, Doe argued that the park ban violated
his First Amendment rights.
While a three-judge panel agreed,"' the Seventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, held otherwise. The Seventh Circuit said the ban was imposed
because of Doe's conduct and only incidentally burdened his
thoughts.5 9 Moreover, his First Amendment rights were not violated
because he did not show that his going to the park was "some-
how ... infused with an expressive element."" And while "the Su-
preme Court has defined the boundaries of expression broadly, it
never has extended the protections of the First Amendment to non-
expressive conduct."" So while City of Lafayette seems to permit ban-
ning a person from a public park based on his confessed thoughts
and his act of going to a public park, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless
held that he was not entitled to First Amendment freedom of thought
protection. To have warranted such protection, his thoughts needed
to be intertwined with expression.
D. Some Cases that Arguably Require Independence
Ironically, however, dicta in Doe v. City of Lafayette provide surpris-
ingly strong support for the independent view. In emphasizing that
Doe's ban was imposed not just for his thoughts, but for his associat-
ed actions, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[a] government entity no
doubt runs afoul of the First Amendment when it punishes an indi-
52 Id. at 759.
53 Id. at 760.
54 Id. at 775 (WilliamsJ., dissenting).
55 Id. at 759.
56 Id. at 760.
57 Id. at 762-63.
58 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 334 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2003).
59 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 766-"7 (7th Cir. 2004).
60 Id. at 764.
61 Id. (internal citation omitted).
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vidual for pure thought."6 If the statement is true, it seems like the
First Amendment protects freedom of thought independent of ex-
pression. The First Amendment cannot require intertwinement with
expression if it forbids legislation that punishes pure thought. The
statement was only dicta, however, because the Seventh Circuit be-
lieved that the ban in this case was imposed because of Doe's con-
duct. And so long as a government restriction has some connection
to conduct, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, the government can regu-
late thought incidentally.
Stanley v. Georgia is probably the Supreme Court case that most
strongly supports the independent view. In Stanley, the defendant was
charged with knowingly possessing obscene films in his home. The
Court held that the First Amendment "prohibit[s] making mere pri-
vate possession of obscene material a crime,"" and the case is
adorned with grand language about our freedom of thought: "I[i]f
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch." Indeed, " [o] ur whole consti-
tutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds."6  Moreover, "[w]hatever the power
of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to public
morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desira-
bility of controlling a person's private thoughts."
Stanley, more so than other Supreme Court cases invoking free-
dom of thought, could be construed as taking a position in the inde-
pendence-intertwinement debate. The Court states in dicta that "the
right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts.... is whol-
ly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment."6 No-
where does the Court explicitly limit the prohibition on mind-
controlling regulations to those affecting expression. Moreover, the
films in Stanley were deemed obscene, which means they fall into a
69category generally not protected by the First Amendment. If so, one
could argue that the protection of Stanley's thoughts was not con-
nected to expression at all but was based on some independent prin-
62 Id. at 765. In context, "pure thought" means thought unconnected to action; it does not
mean morally pure.
63 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 558 (1969).
64 Id. at 568.
65 Id. at 565.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 566.
68 Id. at 565-66.
69 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
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ciple of freedom of thought that the Court seems to have located in
the First Amendment.70
But on its face at least, Stanley could also be understood as a case
about expression: namely, the expression in the films that Stanley
possessed. At least non-obscene motion pictures constitute protected
expression,7 ' and the films may have been deemed sufficiently expres-
sive to make regulations controlling people's access to the films inap-
propriate, even though the films do not themselves receive full First
Amendment protection. Thus, it is not clear whether the Court
sought to protect freedom of thought as such or only to the extent
that thought is sparked by expressive media.
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,7 2 the Supreme Court gestured in
a familiar way to free thought, noting that "First Amendment free-
doms are most in danger when the government seeks to control
thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end."' It took a
small step in support of the independent view by stating that "[t]he
right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be pro-
tected from the government because speech is the beginning of
thought."4 While the statement is far from crystal clear, it could be
read to suggest that interests in free speech are in service to interests
of free thought. Again, however, I doubt we can much rely on the
Court's high-minded rhetoric when we someday face cases that actu-
ally put the priority of freedom of thought to the test.
Bruce Winick argued that the First Amendment ought to protect
people from state efforts to involuntarily medicate them with drugs
70 Cf Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of3D Thought: The First Amendment in Virtual Reality,
30 CARDoZO L. REv. 1141, 1150-51 (2009). A recent Second Circuit case may support a
reading of Stanley consistent with the independent view. See United States v. Valle, 807
F.3d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 2015). The court sought o draw a line between mere fantasies of
violence and the creation of an actual criminal conspiracy to commit violent acts. The
majority cited Stanley for the proposition that "[w]e are loath to give the government he
power to punish us for our thoughts and not our actions." Id. The statement arguably
suggests that Stanley was a case about punishing thought, independent of action (expres-
sive or otherwise).
71 SeeJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) ("It cannot be doubted that
motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may af-
fect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a
political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic
expression. The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not less-
ened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.") (footnote omit-
ted).
72 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
73 Id. at 253.
74 Id.
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that alter thought processes.'5 If his view is correct, the First Amend-
ment may provide direct protection for freedom of thought since
concerns about involuntary medication are not necessarily inter-
twined with expression. But even these cases are closely tied to ex-
pression because the involuntary administration of psychoactive
drugs likely affects the way recipients express themselves.'6 Further-
more, the Supreme Court has never held that forced medication vio-
lates the First Amendment and never mentioned the First Amend-
ment in its important decision in Sell v. United States, which held that,
under some conditions, the government can forcibly medicate de-
fendants to make them competent to stand trial."
Thus, looking at First Amendment cases overall (and I have only
scratched the surface), one might conclude that there is little evi-
dence that the First Amendment independently protects freedom of
thought. Alternatively, the same data support the view that it would
largely be a matter of first impression as to whether thought receives
intertwined or independent protection.
II. PURE THOUGHT CRIME AND THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENT
PROTECTION
A law in New York prohibits registered sex offenders from working
on ice cream trucks. Indeed, a proposed bill would have made do-
ing so a felony." Legislators presumably fear that such jobs give sex
offenders too much unsupervised access to children. And why limit
the reach of such laws, they may someday ask, to those who have al-
ready been convicted of sex offenses? Why not make it a crime for
anyone working on an ice cream truck to have sexual urges directed
at children? While some may be incapable of controlling their
thoughts and urges, if they know they have such urges at least with
any frequency, they could be prohibited from working on ice cream
trucks under penalty of law.
75 Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective,
44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 9 (1989); see also id. at 6 n.20 (identifying supportive statements
from various federal courts).
76 Cf Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that a prisoner
could state a civil rights claim where he alleged he was involuntarily treated with a
"breath-stopping and paralyzing 'fright drug'" because it might constitute "cruel and un-
usual punishment or impermissible tinkering with the mental processes").
77 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
78 N.Y. CoRREcr. LAw § 168-v (2005).
79 A4847, 2013 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013), available at
https://trackbill.com/bill/NY/2013/A4847/makes-the-failure-of-a-sex-offender-to-
register-or.
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One problem with this hypothetical law is that it's difficult to de-
termine who has sexual fantasies about children. But as I noted in
the introduction, researchers are developing techniques to make
such assessments possible. For example, neuroscientists are working
on brain-based forms of lie detection that could be used to query ice
cream truck employees." Such tests may eventually prove more accu-
rate than polygraphs." Already, a couple of companies are selling or
have sold brain-based lie detection services, though courts have so far
refused to admit their results into evidence."
Research studies using fMRI report distinguishing honesty and
deception at accuracies roughly between 70% and 90%," but such
testing has been in artificial contexts and may be flummoxed by sub-
814
jects taking countermeasures to fool such tests. Researchers are also
working on methods of deception detection that do not require sub-
jects to sit calmly in a brain scanner. One team claims to have devel-
oped software that analyzes actual trial transcripts along with infor-
mation about witness gestures to assess deception more accurately
than humans do."
Eventually, we may have methods of lie detection that are practi-
cal, cost-effective, and consistently more accurate than we are. If so,
the government may seek to use these methods in a variety of civil or
criminal contexts. For example, offenders seeking parole might be
asked about their sexual or violent fantasies while their brains are as-
sessed for truthfulness. Since these scanners may not require verbal
responses, they arguably do not implicate rights of expression. Might
80 Current law, at least, would limit the use of such technologies by employers. See Employee
Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 2001-2009 (2006).
81 Cf., e.g., Anthony Wagner, Can Neuroscience Identify Lies?, in A JUDGE'S GUIDE TO
NEUROSCIENCE: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 13, 14 (Michael S. Gazzaniga & Jed S. Rakoff
eds., 2010) ("It is my conclusion that there are no relevant published data that unambig-
uously answer whether fMRI-based neuroscience methods can detect lies at the individu-
al-subject level.").
82 See United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2012) (excluding brain-based lie
detection evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 702); Wilson v. Corestaff
Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (excluding brain-based lie detec-
tion evidence in a civil case mainly on the grounds that credibility is ajury question).
83 Frederick Schauer, Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 85, 93 (Dennis Patterson & Michael S. Pardo
eds., 2016).
84 See Giorgio Ganis et al., Lying in the Scanner: Covert Countermeasures Disrupt Deception Detec-
tion by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 55 NEUROIMAGE 312, 312 (2011).
85 See Ver6nica P6rez-Rosas et al., Deception Detection Using Real-life Trial Data, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 2015 ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
MULTIMODAL INTERACTION, 59-66 (2015); Press Release, University of Michigan, Lie-
Detecting Software Uses Real Court Case Data (Dec. 10, 2015), available at
http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/23356-lie-detecting-software-uses-real-court-case-data.
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the thoughts of potential parolees nevertheless be protected from gov-
ernment inquiry?
A. The Legal Basis for the Voluntary Act Requirement
An English statute from 1351 deemed it treasonous to "imagine"
the death of the King, Queen, or King's eldest son and heir." Some
have argued that the crime consisted simply of imagining the death
of the monarch and did not require any further effort to cause
harm. If so, the statute punished a pure thought crime: a crime de-
fined in terms of mental states alone without reference to an action
(or to an omission to act when one has a duty to do so).
The ability to punish real or alleged thought crimes clearly en-
larges the government's power. In this particular case, the king sends
the message that the crown is so important that any threat to it must
be eliminated at its earliest stage. Furthermore, given the difficulties
of proving what someone imagined, a government can use pure
thought crimes to punish dissenters by accusing them of thought
crimes-whether they occurred or not.
Nowadays, it is generally agreed, as the Model Penal Code states,
"that a civilized society does not punish for thoughts alone."" Under
the criminal law's voluntary act requirement, we do not punish peo-
ple's culpable mental states unless they take some implementing ac-
tion (or fail to act when they are required to).9
The constitutional basis for the voluntary act requirement, howev-
er, is hazy." States, following the lead of the Model Penal Code, may
have statutes requiring crimes to contain a voluntary act." But with-
out a constitutional basis, states can just pass other laws revoking such
86 Statute of Treasons, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2.
87 See George Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REv. 193, 198 (1982) (noting the view
of Thomas Hobbes). Others have argued that even this ancient statute required an overt
act to implement the traitorous thought. Id. (noting the view of Lord Coke).
88 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.01, cmt. 1 at 214-15 (1985). As Michael
Moore puts it, "we blame people for their overt physical actions, not for what they think
(no matter how actively they will their thoughts)." MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 23
(1993).
89 Doug Husak has criticized the voluntary act requirement, arguing that what really matters
is whether a person was in control, not whether or not he acted. Douglas Husak, Rethink-
ing the Voluntary Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2437, 2438 (2007).
90 In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the
Supreme Court recognized that it is unconstitutional to punish someone merely for his
status. These decisions, however, likely have a smaller scope than does the voluntary act
requirement
91 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 ("A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liabil-
ity is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act ... .").
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requirements. Or they could create crimes that punish pure thought
notwithstanding a conflict with a more general law. Under the prin-
ciple of lex specialis,9 2 the more specific law criminalizing thought
might well survive.
If push came to shove and a law really did violate the voluntary act
requirement, I suspect a court would find a constitutional basis for
nullifying it. Whether that protection would come from the First
Amendment is less clear. Given frequent judicial proclamations that
the First Amendment protects freedom of thought, the Amendment
is surely a top contender. That was certainly the view of the Seventh
Circuit in Doe v. Lafayette which, as mentioned, stated in dicta that
"[a] government entity no doubt runs afoul of the First Amendment
when it punishes an individual for pure thought."" A different court
might find a basis in substantive due process or in a combination of
constitutional provisions. But it would not be surprising if the First
Amendment at least lends support to the constitutional grounding of
the voluntary act requirement.
The bottom line, then, is that a plausible case can be made that
the First Amendment prohibits pure thought crimes. And because
pure thought crimes do not in any obvious way implicate expression,
we have some support for the independent view: the First Amend-
ment plausibly protects thought independent of expression.
How important is this protection? Just as kings have sought to
punish pure thought crimes, it is not unimaginable that casinos could
lobby legislators to criminalize pure card counting. Casinos could
use surveillance cameras to track players' eye movements as they scan
cards at the table; cameras might also show subtle lip movements
players inadvertently make as they mentally count cards. Using such
technology, casinos could likely prove, in at least some cases, that a
person was counting cards in his head-even if he never placed a bet.
Since casinos often feel threatened by the prospect of card counting,
they might support legislation to cut it off at its most inchoate stage.
If a jurisdiction tried to ban mere card counting-simply keeping
track of the card count without betting based on the information-
the law would plausibly violate the First Amendment.
Matters get more complicated, however, if a law prohibits betting
on one's mental computations since that would prohibit thoughts
92 See Otto Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 517-18
(1949) (explaining the principle that laws specifically addressing a matter in dispute are
traditionally given greater weight than laws addressing the matter in more general terms).
93 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2004).
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conjoined with a particular action. Before addressing this more diffi-
cult question, I first provide additional background on card counting.
B. Background on Card Counting
In typical casino blackjack games, players receive two cards face-
up. They can request additional cards (one at a time) or stick with
the cards they have already been dealt. The goal is to hold cards with
a higher sum than the dealer holds without going over twenty one.
Once a player's hand totals more than twenty one, he "busts" and los-
es immediately. If the player wins, he ordinarily doubles his money.
The best hand, called blackjack, consists of an ace (valued at eleven
in such instances) and any ten card (meaning a jack, queen, king, or
the ten card itself). When players have blackjack, they usually make a
150% profit on their initial investment.
The dealer also begins the game with two cards, one of which is
face down while players are betting. After players have decided how
to play their hands, the dealer may receive additional cards according
to well-defined rules that give dealers no discretion. Most important-
ly, dealers are required to take additional cards until their hands total
seventeen or higher.
Since players are competing against the dealer rather than each
other, casinos typically allow players to see each other's hands. Card
counters use the publicly available information about the other cards
on the table to adjust their betting decisions. When few ten cards
have been played, for example, more ten cards are likely to arise in
upcoming hands. And when ten cards are more likely, players gain a
slight advantage over the house because they are more likely to have
blackjack (paid at 150% profit), and dealers are more likely to bust,
since they must take an additional card even with a dangerously high
hand of sixteen.4
While there are a variety of card counting systems, card counters
typically convert each face-up card into a number that they add to a
running total. The running total informs how they play their hands.
They will usually bet modest sums until the deck turns to their favor,
at which point they dramatically ramp up the size of their bets.
The task of card counting is difficult because casinos are noisy,
and cards are dealt quickly. Players must use nearly flawless strategy
to play their own hands, while keeping track of the many other cards
94 See Anthony Cabot & Robert Hannum, Advantage Play and Commercial Casinos, 74 Miss. L.
J. 681, 690-93 (2005); Tom Julian, Exclusions and Countermeasures: Do Card Counters Have a
Right to Play? 9 GAMING L. REV. 165, 165 (2005).
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that are dealt. If they succeed, they can develop a statistical edge over
the house. Using the best blackjack strategy possible without counting
cards, the house advantage is below 0.5%. Using the best possible
strategy and counting cards, players can gain a 0.5% to 1.5% ad-
vantage over the house.
Casino owners became especially concerned about card counting
soon after the publication of math professor Edward Thorp's book
Beat the Dealer in 1962 . I have no evidence that casinos sought legis-
lation to criminalize card counting. Perhaps a ban would have of-
fended people's actual or perceived rights to freedom of thought.
Perhaps casinos expected to profit from customers who believed they
could count cards successfully but couldn't." Or perhaps casino
owners had a different strategy. At a conclave organized soon after
the publication of Thorp's book, one casino manager recalls the fol-
lowing proposed alternative method of dispute resolution: "Break a
few legs, and I'll betcha the word will get out real quick that it just
ain't healthy to try to play that count thing in our joints ... that is,
unless they like hospital food."" Indeed, during this period, some
legs may have been broken.
By and large, casinos chose instead to change various rules of
blackjack to improve house odds. These changes proved unpopular
however." Today, most casinos respond to the threat of card count-
ing by shuffling more frequently and using several decks of cards
simultaneously to make counting more difficult and less profitable.'"
Where permitted by law, casinos also seek to identify card counters
and force them to leave the premises."o' (In New Jersey, however, a
state gaming statute and associated regulations have been interpreted
to prohibit casinos from ejecting players merely because they count
cards.) "2
95 Cabot & Hannum, supra note 94, at 693; see also Martin H. Millman, A Statistical Analysis of
Casino Blackjack, 90 AM. MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY 431, 431, 434 (1983) (estimating a pos-
sible 1.35% advantage when four decks are used and 0.91% when six decks are used).
96 See EDWARD O. THORP, BEAT THE DEALER (1962).
97 See wILLIAM POUNDSTONE, FORTUNE'S FORMULA: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE SCIENTIFIC
BETTING SYSTEM 109 (2010) (stating that in the early days of card counting, "[flor every
successful counter, there were hundreds who merely thought they could count cards suc-
cessfully").
98 Id. at 110.
99 Id. at 110-11.
100 Id. at 111.
101 See, e.g., Uston v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 448 F. Supp. 116, 118 (D. Nev. 1978) (holding that
a casino in Nevada that ejected a card counter did not violate his federal civil rights).
102 Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 445 A.2d 370, 373 (N.J. 1982).
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C. Impure Card Counting
As I have already suggested, a law prohibiting mere card counting
would likely be unconstitutional, plausibly because of the First
Amendment. But would the Amendment protect betting based on the
card count? At least on a narrow interpretation, the voluntary act re-
quirement would be powerless against it because the imagined statute
contains an overt act. Granted, these overt acts have to have some
nexus with prohibited mental states. We would not punish "intend-
ing to kill the king" while "playing checkers," because playing check-
ers, while undoubtedly an act, is not an act that in some way imple-
ments or executes the culpable mental state.0 3 Similarly, we would
not punish someone for having a culpable thought or intention
"while strolling around" as strolling around would not ordinarily im-
plement or execute a culpable thought or intention. But we could
likely punish card counting while betting at a casino without violating
the voluntary act requirement.
So, to make my hypothetical card counting prohibition more real-
istic, when I speak simply of "card counting," I will hereafter speak of
card counting that satisfies the voluntary act requirement by prohibit-
ing something like "knowingly increasing one's bet at blackjack at a
licensed gaming establishment when one believes that the card count
is in the player's favor." (Our statute would also have to define card
counting in ways that are not too vague.) Alternatively, our hypothet-
ical statute could prohibit "knowingly increasing one's bet based on
information obtained from cards dealt to other players." Either way,
the prohibition I will discuss punishes the combination of certain
mental processes along with the act of betting or modifying one's bet
at blackjack. My discussion will be of sufficient generality that we
won't need a precise hypothetical statute. But certain versions may
raise more serious thought censorship concerns than others.
Importantly, there may be players who are so mathematically in-
clined that they can barely prevent themselves from keeping track of
other players' cards. At least when narrowly construed, however, the
voluntary act requirement would offer them no help. If they cannot
avoid counting cards, then they should stop increasing their bets
when the card count is favorable or stop playing completely.
Card counters also refrain from betting or refrain from increasing
their bets when the card count is unfavorable. During these times,
card counters at least outwardly behave in ways that are virtually in-
103 See MOORE, supra note 88, at 19 n.5.
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distinguishable from other players. A statute that sought to prohibit
refraining from increasing one's bet would present a close call from
the perspective of the voluntary act requirement, since we only pro-
hibit omissions to act when people have a duty to do so. Perhaps a
legislature could give us a duty to continue betting even when the
card count turns unfavorable, but such a duty would be exotic to say
the least. For simplicity, I will imagine that our hypothetical statute
only prohibits voluntary acts of betting and not voluntary omissions to
bet. I also leave aside myriad interesting questions about what would
constitute attempted card counting or aiding and abetting.
III. THOUGHT-CONDUCT CRIME AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I have argued that the First Amendment plausibly protects
thought independent of expression, where, for example, a person
counts cards without betting on them. Matters are hazier when
thought is conjoined with action. When I've informally queried law
professors in workshop settings as to whether a prohibition on bet-
ting while counting cards would violate the First Amendment, crowds
have tended to split about fifty-fifty.
To assess whether our hypothetical prohibition would violate the
First Amendment, we must first consider whether the pertinent ac-
tions could be deemed expressive. If betting based on the card count
is expressive, such betting may be protected under traditional free
expression principles regardless of whether we adopt the independ-
ent or the intertwined view. If, however, card counting is not expres-
sive, then it won't be protected under traditional principles and the
independent view would provide its only hope for First Amendment
protection. I first consider whether card counting might be pro-
tected expression and then consider how it might be protected even
if it is not.
A. Protection Under the Intertwined View
At least at first glance, blackjack is not the sort of activity typically
considered expressive under current doctrine. Unlike books, maga-
zines, and films that are readily given First Amendment protection,
communication in blackjack is fairly limited. In terms of the expres-
siveness of the conduct, dealing cards is probably not "inten [ded] to
104 I do not address the possibility that card counting might be protected under freedom of
conscience principles in the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
1403
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
convey a particularized message"0 5 nor is it understood to do so. In-
deed, the message is random and likely to be interpreted as such.
Moreover, we already recognize numerous limits on how casinos can
run their games, and they are not typically thought to burden First
Amendment activities. But even if underwhelming, a case can be
made that card counting is protected expression. I will try to make
the argument as forcefully as I can, but I do not deny that many judg-
es would be skeptical.
1. The Expressiveness of Blackjack and Card Counting
While playing cards lack many of the expressive qualities of books
or films, blackjack surely includes communicative elements. Dealers
display graphic symbols, and gamblers respond with decisions about
how to play their hands. It would be a mistake to dismiss the expres-
sive qualities of blackjack simply because the message in the cards is
random: that's the whole point of games of chance like blackjack.
The message is intended to be a random expression. The old
"Choose-Your-Own-Adventure" books (in which readers jump to par-
ticular pages based on the storylines they prefer) are no less expres-
sive because the books contain an interactive component. Indeed,
the message of these books is largely conveyed by the lack of a fore-
ordained plan.o6
The Supreme Court has made clear that modern video games re-
ceive First Amendment protection.' They are protected not in spite
of the role that chance plays in these games but partly because of it:
"video games communicate ideas-and even social messages-
through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue,
plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium
(such as the player's interaction with the virtual world).,,108 While ca-
105 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
106 Cf Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2737-38 (2011) (stating that the inter-
active nature of choose-your-own adventure stories does not make them less deserving of
protection than traditional media).
107 Id. at 2733.
108 Id. In declaring that older, first generation video games lacked the kind of expression
warranting protection, one federal district court said that "a video game, like a pinball
game, a game of chess, or a game of baseball," is principally about entertaining and lacks
the "informational element[s]" required for First Amendment protection. America's Best
Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dep't of Buildings, 536 F. Supp. 170, 174
(E.D.N.Y. 1982). As video games grew increasingly detailed and complex, however, the
tide shifted. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that an ordinance restricting minors' access to violent video games impli-
cated the First Amendment); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279
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sino blackjack lacks the storylines of modem video games, Marc Blitz
has argued that the rationale for extending First Amendment protec-
tion to modern video games ought to apply to board games and other
forms of low-tech gaming.'0 Such games may lack storytelling ele-
ments like plot and characters but so do clearly protected forms of
expression like "the dancing colors and shapes in the animations of
German experimental filmmakers.""o And as the Supreme Court has
noted, "a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying
a 'particularized message,' would never reach the unquestionably
shielded painting ofJackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.""'
Finally, even if the typical casino does not intend to send a mes-
sage when dealing cards, we could imagine a casino that did. Perhaps
it permits card counting on a temporary basis to attract customers or
expects them to lose money by failing to count properly. Or perhaps
it has altered other rules of the game such that management believes
the casino can still profit when players are permitted to count cards.
At this hypothetical casino, a card counting prohibition would argua-
bly alter the meaning it intends to convey when its employees deal
cards. The prohibition would limit the permissible ways in which bet-
tors could legally interpret the casino's message and that would ac-
cordingly limit the casino's expression. So perhaps there could at
least be some circumstances in which a card counting prohibition
burdened the First Amendment interests of a casino.
2. Listener Interests and Rights to Process Information
The better place to look for expressive activity in the case of card
counting, however, is not at the speaker (principally, the casino) but
the listener (principally, the player). Players must process the sym-
bols presented by dealers, and a card counting prohibition could
(D. Colo. 2002) (casting doubt on the informational/entertainment distinction in Ameri-
ca's Best Family Showplace).
109 Marc Jonathan Blitz, A First Amendment for Second Life: What Virtual Worlds Mean for the Law
of Video Games, 11 VAND.J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779, 787, 790-91 (2009). One court upheld a
prison ban on the fantasy role-playing game Dungeons and Dragons, though prisoners
have weaker First Amendment rights than non-prisoners. Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d
529, 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2010); see alsoJohn Schwartz, Dungeons and Dragons Prison Ban Up-
held, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 27, 2010, at Al6.
110 Blitz, supra note 109, at 787, 790.
111 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (ci-
tation omitted).
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raise First Amendment concerns by limiting the way players can re-
ceive and process information. 2
For example, some deaf people have cochlear implants that ena-
ble them to hear sounds they otherwise couldn't. If the state prohib-
ited cochlear implant manufacturers from transducing foreign-
accented communication, the law would likely violate the First
Amendment.
Similarly, suppose a blind blackjack player wants to hire someone
to tell him what cards he is dealt, but a state statute forbids it. Aside
from disability-discrimination concerns, the law would offend the
blind person's First Amendment interests. Details about the expres-
siveness of blackjack would not be especially relevant, nor would it
matter whether casinos intend for blind people to receive their com-
munications. And we need not rely on the fact that a human transla-
tor is speaking to the blind player. If a smartphone with a camera
could tell blind people what cards they've been dealt, laws prohibit-
ing such technology arguably raise the same First Amendment con-
cerns.
So whether or not blackjack satisfies ordinary tests for expressive-
ness, some courts might conclude that we should be allowed to pro-
cess blackjack-related information as we'd like, free from government
control, just as blind and deaf people ought to be allowed to process
the information around them free from government control. While
a card counting prohibition wouldn't entirely censor card infor-
mation, it would burden the way people can "listen" to the message.
The state can neither prevent you from seeing a new Woody Allen
film, nor prohibit you from thinking that the film expresses Allen's
existentialist dread. The state can neither prohibit you from reading
the Bible nor from identifying secret numerical codes you think it
contains. The basic principle that the state cannot dictate how we
process information applies not only to books and films but also to
street signs, comments strangers make to us on a bus, and the labels
on cans of tomato soup. We not only have legal rights to access these
varied sources of expression but also have rights to think about them
as we'd like.
Thus, we cannot rule out First Amendment protection for card
counting under the intertwined view, because a prohibition on card
counting would burden our ability to receive and process the kind of
112 Cf. Charles Fried, Perfect Freedom, Perfect Justice, 8 B.U. L. REv. 717, 723 (1998) ("A notion
of freedom of thought which does not allow the thought to be expressed or which controls
what thoughts one may receive is immediately and obviously absurd.") (emphasis added).
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incidental communication that the First Amendment protects, even
when these messages are randomly generated. Consider tarot
cards."" A law that prohibited private individuals from using tarot
cards to inform their stock market purchases would raise First
Amendment concerns. It would be ironic if we were more protective
of tarot-style random interpretation of future events than the more
accurate predictions of future events enabled by card counting.
3. Card Counting and Thought-Content Discrimination
The hypothetical prohibition we are considering applies to how
one may bet when engaging in certain mental computations, and
surely the government has broad rights to regulate betting. Indeed,
the government can probably prohibit betting on blackjack entirely.
So we ought to be skeptical of the relevance of the expressiveness of
blackjack and card counting, given that we are considering a prohibi-
tion on betting while counting cards.
The prohibition might nevertheless be suspect because it engages
in the thought equivalent of content discrimination. The prohibition
permits betting on a future event using the basic calculations re-
quired to play blackjack (adding up the value of the cards in one's
own hand) but not using the more predictive calculations employed
by card counters. In more traditional First Amendment terms, a card
counting prohibition would arguably constitute content discrimina-
tion that limits the ways we are allowed to interpret communications.
Such "thought-content" discrimination arguably raises First
Amendment concerns. Though it is difficult to say what the prohibi-
tion on content discrimination amounts to in the card counting con-
text,1 4 such content discrimination could make a card counting pro-
hibition presumptively invalid."' The Supreme Court has stated that
"above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its sub-
ject matter, or its content.""'
113 Some people use tarot cards as part of their religious practices. SeeKay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d
1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a prisoner could proceed with his First
Amendment free exercise claim based on denial of access to tarot cards). So as not to
implicate First Amendment religious principles, we can understand the example in terms
of tarot-like cards that people invest with deep, though non-religious significance.
114 Cf Leslie Kendrick, Content Discimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REv. 231, 239, 242 (2012)
("Perhaps the biggest difficulty with content discrimination is that 'content' is hardly self-
defining.").
115 SeeR.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1991).
116 Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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Importantly, even if card counting is not an expressive activity as
ordinarily understood, it might be deemed sufficiently expressive to
make content discrimination off limits. Expression that is ordinarily
excluded from protection under the First Amendment, like libel, ob-
scenity, or fighting words, can still be protected from laws that dis-
criminate based on content. As Justice Antonin Scalia stated in
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, "the government may proscribe libel; but it
may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only
libel critical of the government.""' Similarly, a city council could not
"enact an ordinance prohibiting only those legally obscene works that
contain criticism of the city government or, indeed, that do not in-
clude endorsement of the city government.""'
Thought censorship in the card counting context is not as trou-
bling as the censorship in Scalia's examples. A card counting prohi-
bition, invasive as it would be, would not pertain to issues of such
public importance. Yet "[n] o suggestion can be found in the Consti-
tution that the freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press
bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance of the ideas
seeking expression.""9 Moreover, a card counting prohibition would
arguably mean that the state is restricting predictions about the fu-
ture in ways that depend on the factual accuracy of those predictions.
While the state "may punish people for causing various harms, direct-
ly or indirectly[,] it generally may not punish speakers when the
harms are caused by what the speaker said-by the persuasive, in-
formative, or offensive force of the facts or opinions expressed."20
And the harm that would motivate a card counting prohibition would
be directly related to the value of the information card counting pro-
vides.
Of course, one could argue that a card counting prohibition
would not constitute content discrimination at all. The purpose of
the law would simply be to avoid a particular kind of societal harm-
namely, obtaining above-fair-rate odds at blackjack (where the fair
rate is the minimum advantage the house has relative to players who
make the most strategic choices without counting cards). So
phrased, the government would arguably not be trying to meddle
117 505 U.S. at 384.
118 Id.; see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection of the First
Amendment Should Be More Like That of the Fourth, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 394 (2010).
119 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941).
120 Volokh, supra note 36, at 1301. Volokh recognizes exceptions for speech outside the typ-
ical categories of First Amendment expression. Id. at 1301 n.112.
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with people's thoughts; it would just be protecting the profits of a
highly-regulated industry that pays a lot in taxes.
On the other hand, every time the government engages in con-
tent discrimination, we can imagine some superficially content-
neutral explanation. A law banning anarchists from journalism jobs
could be said to protect content-neutral interests in reducing vio-
lence and disorder. The fair profits rationale for prohibiting card
counting may be a facade as well because even if the government is
seeking fair returns to casinos, the rationale for banning card count-
ing is centrally tied to the government's promotion of less acute ra-
ther than more acute observations of the betting table. Unlike false
speech, which sometimes has lower value than true speech (as in cas-
es of defamation), card counting predictions are more accurate than
predictions made without card counting. Moreover, it is hardly obvi-
ous what odds are "fair" in a game that is rigged to give the casino an
advantage. There is no official rule of blackjack that makes card
counting impermissible. Indeed, some members of a team of
churchgoing card counters describe the activity as a spiritual enter-
prise to take money away from exploitative casinos. '2
Finally, even a content-neutral prohibition on card counting
might be suspect in the unlikely event that card counting were
deemed symbolically expressive.' In United States v. O'Brien, the Su-
preme Court held that symbolically expressive activities, like sit-ins,
vigils, and flag burning, may be protected by the First Amendment
even when they are burdened by content-neutral regulations.1 2 - The
Court stated:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
124
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
While states certainly have the power to regulate casinos, it's not ob-
vious that a card counting prohibition furthers an "important or sub-
stantial" government interest with a restriction that is "no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Without a crimi-
nal prohibition on card counting, Las Vegas casinos make adequate
121 HoLY ROLLERS: THE TRUE STORY OF CARD COUNTING CHRISTIANS (Warner Bros. 2012).
122 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
123 See id. at 376-77; see aLo Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403, 406 (1989).
124 391 U.S. at 377.
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profits by ejecting people they believe are counting cards, and there
are many successful techniques for identifying card counters.2
Even if casinos have difficulty identifying card counters, they
could simply use the approaches taken by Atlantic City casinos which
are prohibited from ejecting card counters by a New Jersey Supreme
Court decision.2" These casinos shuffle the cards more frequently
and alter other practices to make card counting less profitable. And
they still generate enormous revenues tied to blackjack. Casinos
might even go further and form contracts with players that prohibit
them from card counting. All of these approaches avoid the need for
criminalization. Of course, it's easy to invent a hypothetical criminal
law and then show that it's unnecessary. The key point, though, is
that even if the expressive interests in card counting are not especial-
ly high, the interests in burdening the activity are not especially high
either.
4. Blackjack and Commercial Speech
The value of the expression associated with card counting may
depend on the context. It might be constitutional to prohibit card
counting in the highly regulated casino environment but unconstitu-
tional to do so for casual blackjack games played in people's homes
without wagering real money. Casinos are businesses, and commer-
cial speech receives less protection than non-commercial speech.1 7
The "core notion of commercial speech" refers to expression that
"does no more than propose a commercial transaction."'" Under
some card counting strategies, even after a bet is placed, players
might alter how they play based on the card count. Since they have
already set their bets, the information provided by card counting
would not pertain to a proposed transaction. More generally, however,
players do adjust their bets based on the card count in ways that ar-
guably propose an economic transaction.
At the same time, blackjack is not solely a commercial transaction.
Even card counters can appreciate blackjack's entertainment value.
When speech does more than propose an economic transaction, the
Supreme Court has focused on three factors to assess whether speech
is commercial. Speech is more likely to be deemed commercial when
125 Casino System to Spot Card Counters Before They Cash In, supra note 11.
126 Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 445 A.2d 370, 371 (N.J. 1982).
127 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980).
128 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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it constitutes an advertisement, refers to particular products (or ser-
vices), and has an economic motivation.1 29 So viewed, card counting
at blackjack does not fit the traditional mold of commerce. It's not
an advertisement and does not clearly refer to a product or service. It
probably has an economic motivation, though, as noted, it also has
entertainment value. So card counting probably does not relate
"solely to the economic interests of the speaker and audience." "
More importantly, however, typical rationales for giving less pro-
tection to commercial speech do not obviously apply to the thought
processes of the recipients of the speech.'3 ' Suppose, for example, that
commercial speech receives less protection than non-commercial
speech because: (1) commercial entities have weaker autonomy in-
terests in free expression than non-commercial speakers;3 2 or (2) the
government has special interests in protecting consumers from po-
tentially deceptive commercial speech.3 3 Under either of these ra-
tionales, there is no good reason to weaken protection of the thought
processes of the recipients of the speech. We can't fix misleading
commercial speech by restricting the ways individual consumers can
critically analyze it. Indeed, I know of no cases giving commercial
speech listeners reduced First Amendment rights relative to other lis-
teners.
5. Replies to Freedom of Thought Minimalists
As I warned, the argument that the First Amendment protects
pure card counting is much stronger than the argument that it pro-
tects betting while card counting. According to the view that I'll call
"freedom of thought minimalism," we are allowed to punish people
for thoughts, provided those thoughts are combined with conduct.
To the freedom of thought minimalist, we are only protected from
laws that solely target thought. So long as we punish some conduct
along with thought, the law is immune to the First Amendment. The
freedom of thought minimalist concedes that we could not punish a
129 Id. at 66-67.
130 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
131 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976) (stating that there is a public interest in disseminating information that makes
consumer economic decisions more "intelligent and well informed").
132 Cf Shiffrin, supra note 27, at 296 (stating that "commercial speech, by design, issue[s]
from an environment whose structure does not facilitate and, indeed, tends to discourage
the authentic expression of individuals' judgment").
133 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) ("[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.").
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person merely for counting cards, but claims we can punish those
who bet based on the card count.
Consider the following argument posed by freedom of thought
minimalists to show why we can punish those who bet based on the
card count: First, the criminal law regularly punishes people for
thoughts so long as they are combined with actions (or omissions
when one has a duty to act). The doctrine of provocation, for exam-
ple, makes a person's homicide liability depend on his mental and
emotional and state at the time of the killing.1 4 More broadly still,
the entire doctrine of mens rea implies that certain actions are permis-
sible when one has certain beliefs and intentions but not others.3 5
It is widely agreed, for example, that an act can be criminalized
when conjoined with knowledge that the act will cause some prohib-
ited result such as death. Suppose a team of NASA engineers has de-
signed parts for a new space shuttle. Through a series of innovative,
Nobel-Prize-worthy computations, one of the engineers realizes that
the shuttle will explode soon after it launches. If this engineer takes
steps to proceed with the launch secretly knowing that it will explode
and cause death, he will be liable for murder. This is so even if his
computations are so novel and complex that the others on his team
are completely without fault. No one is saying he should not have
made the calculations; but once he did, he should not have proceed-
ed with the launch. Similarly, the freedom of thought minimalist ar-
gues, people may have a right to monitor the card count, but once
they do, they have no right to cause harmful actions while doing so.
This objection raises deep and difficult questions about the dis-
tinction, if any, between arguably protected thought-conduct pairings
and the day-to-day crimes we regularly punish. As I stated at the out-
set, my goal here is not to tackle the deep normative question, "when
and under what circumstances should we punish thought or thought-
conduct pairings?" Rather, I make a predictive claim about the sorts
of arguments that might be persuasive to courts. Let me, then, con-
sider some reasons why courts might perceive a difference between a
criminal prohibition on betting while counting cards and the more
general machinery of the criminal law.
One potential difference is that crimes such as murder do not dis-
criminate based on a method of thinking in the way that a card counting
134 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (mitigating murder to manslaughter when
"committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse").
135 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 ("[A] person is not guilty of an offense unless he act-
ed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently. . . .").
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prohibition would. The ingenious NASA engineer is punished for
acting in the face of his knowledge of certain facts no matter how ob-
tained. By contrast, the card counter is punished for relying on a
particular method of thinking and that may be especially troubling.
For example, if the government can ban card counting, then it can
ban some methods of card counting and not others. And if it can
punish increasing one's bet based on the card count, then it can ban
increasing one's bet because one thinks the dealer is attractive or be-
cause one hopes to impress a friend. Such possibilities highlight the
ways in which government thought control arguably threatens auton-
omy and well-being.
The freedom of thought minimalist might respond by arguing
that a card counting prohibition is not really aimed at a particular
method of thinking. Itjust bans knowledge of a certain fact (the card
count) and acting in spite of it (increasing one's bet to obtain an un-
fair advantage), much like the murder prohibition that applied to the
NASA engineer. In fact, a player who is good at identifying others
who count cards and mimics their bets would violate a prohibition
framed as "knowingly increasing one's bet believing that the count is
in his favor." So, the argument goes, card counters are not being
punished for their methods of thinking either but only for having
knowledge that they use to cause harm.
Even in this variation, however, our hypothetical prohibition still
punishes the card counting mimic for relying on a particular method
of thinking (albeit thought processes engaged in by others). We
might look askance at such punishment, just as we would hesitate to
punish someone for investing in the stock market based on advice
from someone else's interpretation of tarot cards. In other words, a
judge might believe, the card counting prohibition punishes card
counters' thoughts in a manner that directly relates to the "persua-
sive, informative .. . force"13 6 of those thoughts in a way that is not the
case for the ingenious engineer.
Freedom of thought minimalists might also note that we allow
sentencing enhancements for hate crimes,"' meaning we allow in-
creased punishments for crimes motivated by racial and other forms
of animus. We also prohibit employment decisions motivated by vari-
ous forms of discrimination.'3 If we take the motivating reasons for
136 Volokh, supra note 36, at 1301.
137 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 479 (1993).
138 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (prohibiting most
forms of employment discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and na-
tional origin).
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people's actions into account in these settings, why can't we do the
same in the card counting context?
While the constitutionality of hate crime enhancements and of
civil laws against employment discrimination appears to be settled,
such laws should plausibly be understood as limited exceptions to
more general principles designed to remedy serious forms of discrim-
ination. Admittedly, the Supreme Court does not say these are in-
stances in which thought-content discrimination survives strict scruti-
ny, but one might argue that that's what is really going on. Indeed,
courts might worry that if freedom of thought minimalism were cor-
rect, it would make freedom of thought protection too weak. The
First Amendment might be powerless to resist sentencing enhance-
ments for those who use calculus to commit a crime or select a victim
based on sexual attractiveness. Similarly, it might be powerless to
prevent civil laws that ban school teachers who have "deviant" sexual
fantasies or bankers who are suspicious of capitalism.
Contra freedom of thought minimalists, such thought-content
discrimination seems plausibly prohibited by First Amendment pro-
tections on freedom of thought. True, other constitutional provi-
sions might be implicated as well, but given the language already as-
sociating freedom of thought with the First Amendment, courts may
rely on the First Amendment to protect some forms of thought, even
when conjoined with voluntary acts.
Betting while card counting might represent a better than average
contender for protection because the harms associated with card
counting, if there are any, hardly have the seriousness of the harms of
employment discrimination or hate crime. Moreover, recognizing
that a law or regulation burdens thought does not mean that the law
or regulation is necessarily unconstitutional. It may simply mean that
we need to consider the magnitude of the harms associated with the
regulation relative to the burden on thought, and a card counting
prohibition plausibly fails to survive the balancing.
By contrast, suppose that, in the future, a team of MIT researchers
develops self-replicating nanobots designed to identify card counters.
When a nanobot finds a card counter, it whispers the player's de-
scription into the blackjack dealer's ear. Casino owners across the
country begin using the barely-visible nanobots. As time goes on,
however, the nanobots periodically malfunction and cause dealers
permanent hearing loss. Efforts to find and destroy all the nanobots
prove unsuccessful. With no easy solution in sight, state legislatures
contemplate banning card counting to preserve dealers' hearing abil-
ity. Such bans would still engage in thought-content discrimination,
but they would do so for more significant reasons. We might prefer
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that legislatures simply ban blackjack, but a law that prohibited card
counting to promote health and safety would be more acceptable
under these unusual circumstances.
B. Protection Under the Independent View
I have just explored First Amendment protection of betting while
card counting under the intertwined view. Another possibility is that
the Amendment protects thought independently, even when betting.
So, if courts are unpersuaded that card counting implicates First
Amendment expression, card counting might still warrant protection.
There is virtually no evidence, however, as to whether or how inde-
pendent freedom of thought protection would apply to thought-
conduct pairings; we can only speculate.3 9
Courts would likely search for analogues of free expression doc-
trine in the domain of thought regulation. Judges would ask ques-
tions like: are thoughts being burdened in a manner that is content-
discriminative? What are the state interests in burdening certain
thoughts? What categories of thought, if any, are so low-valued that
they do not warrant freedom of thought protection? Can we burden
the thoughts of the hypothetical NASA engineer because "knowledge
of causing death" is the thought-equivalent of fighting words?
Though the Supreme Court has never explicitly crafted a test for
the protection of thought independent of expression,'4 Dana Remus
purports to have identified the test the Court would use:
The framework begins with a private realm of free thought into which
the government cannot intrude. Where the Court finds that a regulation
intrudes upon this private realm, the Court will apply strict scrutiny, eval-
uating whether the regulation is the least restrictive means of serving a
compelling government interest. Where the Court finds that a regula-
tion on conduct has only an incidental impact on a private realm of
thought, it will balance the government's interest with the implicated
141
First Amendment interest.
139 According to Glenn Cohen, some might defend rape and incest exceptions to an abor-
tion prohibition on the ground that abortions under those conditions have more ac-
ceptable motivations than usual. See I. Glenn Cohen, Are All Abortions Equal? Should There
Be Exceptions to the Criminalization of Abortion for Rape and Incest?, 43J. L., MED. & ETHICS 87
(2014). Cohen argues, however, that if such reasoning were implemented in the law, it
would raise concerns about inappropriate thought policing in violation of the First
Amendment. Id. His analysis likely requires acceptance of the independence hypothesis
since it seems doubtful that, under current doctrine, the typical woman seeking abortion
is engaged in First Amendment-protected expression.
140 Dana Remus Irwin, Freedom of Thought: The Fint Amendment and the Scientific Method, 2005
Wis. L. REV. 1479, 1507 (2005).
141 Id.
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While Remus might be right, it is surely hard to extract the frame-
work by which the Court would decide an independent freedom of
thought case when it has never actually done so.
The Seventh Circuit speculated about how the First Amendment
might operate independent of expression in Doe v. City of Lafayette. As
discussed earlier, Doe was a pedophile with a history of sexually as-
saulting children. He was prohibited from entering public parks in
Lafayette, Indiana after an incident in which he admitted watching
children play as he fantasized about them and had sexual urges di-
rected toward them.1 42 The Seventh Circuit sitting en banc affirmed
the lower court's decision and stated in a footnote that if Doe's pe-
dophilic urges trigger First Amendment scrutiny, they would fall un-
der an exception, just like child pornography does:
Even if we were to determine that Mr. Doe's sexual urges somehow trig-
gered First Amendment scrutiny, they would be excepted from First
Amendment protection under the incitement and obscenity doctrines.
Given the context in which the urges occurred and the action they pre-
cipitated, they were, in a very real sense, "directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and [were] likely to incite or produce such
action." . . .Furthermore, Mr. Doe's urges, if they triggered First
Amendment scrutiny, would be characterized as a form of child pornog-
raphy, the possession and distribution of which has been held unprotect-
ed by the Supreme Court.43
Of course, the court quickly reiterated that because Doe's conduct
did not involve expression, "it is quite unrealistic even to talk about
these doctrines in this case."'m The comments are nevertheless puz-
zling for at least two reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit mistakenly as-
serts that if Doe's urges triggered First Amendment scrutiny, they
would constitute unprotected child pornography. In Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition,4 5 the Supreme Court struck down federal legislation
that banned so-called "virtual" child pornography that appears to de-
pict minors but does not actually depict real people.14 6 In deeming
virtual child pornography a form of expression covered by the First
Amendment, the Court considered it important that no children
were actually harmed in its production.4 1
Yet no matter how vivid Doe's imagination is, his fantasies seem
more like protected virtual child pornography than unprotected ac-
142 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 759-60 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
143 Id. at 764 n.7.
144 Id
145 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
146 Id. at 239-40, 256.
147 Id. at 254.
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tual child pornography. No children are harmed when Doe merely
invents images in his head. Indeed, if Doe were capable of crafting
photo-realistic artwork from his imagination, the work would, almost
by definition, constitute protected virtual child pornography.
Second, the Seventh Circuit is mistaken when it suggests more
broadly that rights to freedom of thought have categorical exceptions
in the way that freedom of expression does. As noted, the Seventh
Circuit stated that " [a] government entity no doubt runs afoul of the
First Amendment when it punishes an individual for pure thought."'"
The Seventh Circuit's view that the First Amendment protects pure
thought, in conjunction with its assertion that there are excepted cat-
egories of thought, suggests that we can punish people solely for
thoughts that fall under an exception. If so, it would mean we could
punish people merely for having thoughts that would be libelous if
expressed but that are never actually expressed. It would also mean that
we couldn't punish people merely for having fantasies and urges to
rape directed at adults (protected thoughts) but could punish people
merely for having fantasies and urges directed at children (unpro-
tected thoughts). Perhaps the Seventh Circuit intended such excep-
tions to only apply to thought combined with action or perhaps it be-
lieved the criminal law's voluntary act requirement would
independently make such laws off limits. But the Seventh Circuit
never qualifies its discussion, and it is not obvious how the Seventh
Circuit would justify excepting some categories of thought from pro-
tection but not others.
1. The If-Expressed Test
I will take one modest step toward imagining what freedom of
thought doctrine could look like when applied to thought-conduct
pairings on the assumption that the First Amendment provides inde-
pendent protection. Under what I call the "if-expressed" test, we
cannot punish you for some thought-conduct pairing if you would be
protected from engaging in the same conduct paired with the expres-
sion of those thoughts. So, returning to the sorts of cases I described
in the introduction, a law prohibiting "camping in a public park
while thinking the mayor is incompetent" would violate the First
Amendment if a law providing that "camping in a public park while
expressing that the mayor is incompetent" would violate the First
Amendment. A law that refuses immigration opportunities or welfare
148 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2004).
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benefits to those who do not believe in global warming would violate
the Amendment if a law that refuses immigration opportunities or
welfare benefits to those who express disbelief in global warming
would violate the Amendment. Similarly, if Doe's act of going to a
public park would have been constitutionally protected had he vocal-
ized his thoughts and urges, then he would have also been protected
for going to a public park while merely having sexual thoughts and
urges.
The if-expressed test would connect free thought and free speech
protection in a modest way. When engaging in some protected
speech-conduct pairing, one presumably has thoughts related to
one's speech. If we're going to protect thought independent of ex-
pression (as we are currently assuming), then we need not require
that the thought actually be expressed.
The if-expressed test is surely modest, but it is not trivial. For ex-
ample, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,'4 9
some students wore black armbands to express objections to the mili-
tary conflict in Vietnam.5 0 The Supreme Court held that Des Moines
school officials unconstitutionally violated the students' First
Amendment rights when it prohibited the students' expressive activi-
ty.m But if the students had no expressive goal in wearing the arm-
bands or the school had no suppressive goal in prohibiting them, the
case might have come out differently. Expressing ideas sometimes
acts as a kind of defense to conduct that you could not engage in ab-
sent expression.
Now imagine that a student wears an armband to remind himself
of his own objections to war and has no intent to express anything to
anyone by doing so. Imagine further that a school official sought to
prohibit this non-expressive behavior to prevent the student from
reminding himself of his own thoughts and feelings. The if-
expressed test would prohibit the school official's behavior. If the
student had engaged in the same conduct (wearing the armband)
while expressing his thoughts or feeling (his opposition to war), his
conduct would be protected because of the Supreme Court's decision
in Tinker. The if-expressed test is non-trivial because it makes clear
that you cannot penalize some thought-conduct pairing if you could
not penalize the same conduct paired with expressed versions of the
thought.
149 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
150 Id. at 504.
151 Id. at 514.
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The if-expressed test is also modest in that it leaves many im-
portant questions unaddressed. For example, it tells us little about
card counting. The test says that we cannot punish you for betting
while counting cards if we could not punish you for betting while ex-
pressing card-count-related thoughts. But that still leaves us to decide
whether you have a constitutional right to be free from punishment
for discussing the card count while betting. To the extent we have
such a right, the if-expressed test says that we also have the right to
count cards without expressing the card count.
Notice that the if-expressed test has a particular direction. It pro-
tects thoughts if their expressed equivalents would be protected. It
does not, however, address the reverse direction: whether we can
punish expression that would have been protected if it remained
merely in thought. This reverse inference is doubtful. For example,
we might protect unexpressed "libelous thoughts" without protecting
libelous speech. Similarly, we might protect Doe's sitting in a park
with sexual thoughts and urges, even if his expression of those
thoughts and urges would have constituted unprotected threats or
harassment. In such cases, the if-expressed test is simply silent, and
we must fall back on other First Amendment principles.
C. The Constitutionality ofAnti-Device Laws
Even though we do not generally criminalize card counting, we do
criminalize card counting using a device,5 1 like a smartphone. When
people started using computers to help them count cards in the
1970s, casinos successfully lobbied for legislation to criminalize de-
vice-assisted card counting.15 3 Nevada's anti-device law is fairly typical:
It is unlawful for any person at a licensed gaming establishment o use, or
possess with the intent to use, any device to assist:
1. In projecting the outcome of the game;
2. In keeping track of the cards played;
3. In analyzing the probability of the occurrence of an event relating
to the game; or
4. In analyzing the strategy for playing or betting to be used in the
game,
except as permitted by the commission.154
152 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 465.075 (2013).
153 I. Nelson Rose, Card Counting Devices Made Griminal in BLAcKJACK AND THE LAW 80, 82-83
(I. Nelson Rose & Robert A. Loeb eds., 1998).
154 NEV. REv. STAT. § 465.075. While the last part of the anti-device statute allows the state
gaming commission to make exceptions, there are currently no exceptions listed for
blackjack. Regulations of the Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming Control
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For example, in the 1980s, a blackjack player was convicted of vio-
lating the statute for using special shoes with toe switches wired to a
computer strapped to his calf.' The computer caused an athletic
supporter he was wearing to vibrate in ways that signaled how he
should play his hands. While the defendant argued that the anti-
device statute was unconstitutionally vague, his argument was unsuc-
cessful.1 6
The case does not, however, address potential First Amendment
claims. If prohibitions on ordinary card counting raise First Amend-
ment concerns either under the intertwined or independent views,
then casino anti-device laws may do so as well. Anti-device laws would
be most suspect if they applied to private blackjack games played for
fun; presumably the government cannot prohibit us from using de-
vices to make calculations in our private lives. But even in casinos,
these laws limit the ways technology allows us to process information.
To my knowledge, no one has challenged such laws on First Amend-
ment grounds.
Some behaviors protected by the First Amendment remain so
even when they are technologically aided. We have rights to speak in
public with or without a megaphone.'-" The government can regulate
the harmful side effects of sound amplification, but technologically-
assisted speech is still speech for First Amendment purposes. Similar-
ly, the First Amendment protects the faster and broader distribution
of speech enabled by the Internet. Other behaviors, however, lose
their protection when they are technologically assisted. For example,
we have rights to walk down the street and overhear people's conver-
sations so long as we use our technologically unassisted ears. But
eavesdropping laws widely-viewed as constitutional prevent us from
doing so "by means of any electronic, mechanical or other device."5
While eavesdropping laws prohibit certain uses of technology to
aid our senses, a closer analogue to card counting comes from con-
troversy over encryption restrictions. An encryption algorithm takes
Board § 5.150 (1987). It is possible, though, that the chair of the state gaming control
board has allowed exceptions not listed in the regulations. Id.
155 Clark Cnty. v. Anderson, 746 P.2d 643, 643-44 (Nev. 1987).
156 Id. at 644. Subsequent case law, however, leaves it unclear whether the holding of the
case is still valid. See Las Vegas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 146
P.3d 240, 245 (Nev. 2006).
157 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81-82 (1949) ("Absolute prohibition within municipal
limits of all sound amplification, even though reasonably regulated in place, time and
volume, is undesirable and probably unconstitutional as an unreasonable interference
with normal activities.").
158 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.010-526.020 (West 1974).
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certain information, processes it, and returns the information in a
scrambled form that cannot be understood without a key to decode
it.
If the Seventh Circuit is right that the First Amendment prohibits
punishing us solely for thoughts,"9 then you cannot be punished
merely for thinking through these complicated algorithms in your
head. This is so, even if such algorithms can be used to encrypt com-
plicated messages that cannot be deciphered by law enforcement.
But assuming we have a right to mentally encrypt messages along with
a right to leave the country while doing so, do we also have a constitu-
tional right to export a device that does the same computations?
In the late 1990s, some people challenged federal laws limiting
the export of "source code" (uncompiled software written by humans
in a programming language) that encrypts messages." In Bernstein v.
United States Department ofJustice, the critical question was whether ex-
port restrictions on encryption source code constituted a prior re-
straint on expression.6' The court determined that source code is
indeed "expressive for First Amendment purposes, and thus is enti-
tied to the protections of prior restraint doctrine."6 1
Interestingly, the court thought it noteworthy that source code "is
meant to be read and understood by humans, and that it cannot be
used to control directly the functioning of a computer."6 3 In other
words, at least in the mind of this court, it seems possible that we may
have a right to engage in mental calculations and encode those calcu-
lations into source code without necessarily having the right to use a
computer to do the same calculations more quickly. Similarly, a First
Amendment right to count cards might not entail a legal right to use
devices for assistance. Sometimes technological assistance eviscerates
a legal right, sometimes it does not."
159 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
160 See, e.g., Junger v. Daley, 209 F. 3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice,
176 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d
1308 (9th Cir. 1999); Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 714 (2000).
161 See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1138.
162 Id. at 1141.
163 Id. at 1142. In light of changes to the export regulations, however, Bernstein lost
standing to bring his case. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir.
1999); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, No. C 95-0582 MHP, 2004 WL 838163, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2004).
164 Perhaps we are more willing to restrict cognitive or sensory abilities when they are tech-
nologically enhanced than when they are technologically unassisted. See generally Adam J.
Kolber, Criminalizing Cognitive Enhancement at the Blackjack Table, in MEMORY AND LAw 307
(L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2012).
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We could decide that anti-device laws do raise First Amendment
concerns but admit that the concerns are limited to a narrow sphere
of life. After all, some limitations on expression are warranted. A
state professional licensing exam might prohibit test-takers from con-
sulting reference materials (clearly expressive media) and from using
calculators (devices that aid with computation) for the duration of an
exam. Such rules may serve important functions: we don't want li-
censed paramedics looking up basic reference information. The
rules burden First Amendment interests but do so in such time-and-
place-limited ways that, in run of the mill contexts, the rules would
presumably survive whatever level of scrutiny applied.
But the interests supporting anti-device laws seem small in com-
parison. As noted, many casinos that permit ordinary card counting
still have profitable blackjack tables-they simply alter other aspects
of game play to restore the casino's overall advantage. Casinos could
use such techniques if anti-device statutes were prohibited. Moreo-
ver, holding anti-device laws unconstitutional would hardly make de-
vice use welcome at the blackjack table. Casinos in Las Vegas and
elsewhere already eject card counters and could continue to do so
whether or not players use device assistance. So while the burdens of
anti-device laws are hardly crushing, their benefits are modest as well.
Some courts might be skeptical of the use of the criminal law to limit
our rights to use public information when there are less burdensome
ways of maintaining casino profitability.
CONCLUSION
I have focused on two views of First Amendment thought privacy.
On one view, the Amendment protects thought independently; on
the other, it only protects thought when intertwined with expression.
While current doctrine fails to settle the matter, I argue that the First
Amendment plausibly protects thought separate and apart from ex-
pression. And if thought is protected independently, then unlike
every holding in free speech cases to date, the First Amendment
could apply to cases that do not involve any sort of expression at all.
A related question is whether First Amendment protection of
thought is automatically eviscerated when thought is punished along
with particular conduct or whether the Amendment may nevertheless
offer protection. Thoughts on this legal issue are necessarily specula-
tive: many courts would be troubled by state efforts to control the
way we play games like blackjack in informal settings. Even inside ca-
sinos, some courts may find the suppression of the incidental com-
munication between dealers and players troubling, and the tradition-
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al rationales for giving less protection to commercial speech do not
obviously apply to card counting. A card counting prohibition would
censor the ways in which people are permitted to interpret publicly
available data about the world. Moreover, interests in bolstering ca-
sino profits make for a weak justification of a criminal law, especially
when casinos have ample methods of coping. Efforts to frame the
state's goal as trying to ensure fair profits may appear suspect given
that the entire game is arranged to give casinos the upper hand, and
the rules of blackjack do not ordinarily forbid card counting.
But mere qualms about criminalizing card counting are surely not
enough to establish the existence of a constitutional protection.
Quite plausibly, our centuries-old Constitution was never intended to
block states from prohibiting card counting. If so, we may someday
see efforts to create a freedom of thought amendment. Such an
amendment might be especially important as neurotechnologies im-
prove.
In one recent study, researchers looked at the brain activity of pe-
dophiles relative to non-pedophiles when shown images of nude
children. Based only on brain activity, researchers accurately classi-
fled the pedophilia status of more than 90% of subjects. 16 In such a
world, the state may try to intervene even before people like John
Doe get to a park to look at children. And while some might find
that a welcome prospect, risks to thought privacy should not be ig-
nored. About three-quarters of men and two-thirds of women admit
to having homicidal fantasies. We all, it seems, have interests in en-
suring that thought privacy is properly protected.
165 See, e.g., Game Rules: Blackjack, HOYLE, http://www.hoylegaming.com/c-16-rules
.aspx#blackjack (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
166 Jorge Ponseti et al., Assessment of Pedophilia Using Hemodynamic Brain Response to Sexual
Stimuli, 69 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 187, 187 (2012). While this technique is subject to
countermeasures, so are current techniques. See id. at 193 (stating that brain scans of pe-
dophiles "might be less susceptible to manipulation [than phallometry] because the par-
ticipant has no time to elicit prepared responses to varying stimuli in a fast, event-related
fMRI setting").
167 Douglas T. Kenrick & Virgil Sheets, Homicidal Fantasies, 14 ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY
231, 235 (1993).
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